1 00:00:00,271 --> 00:00:03,354 ^("The Marines Hymn") 2 00:00:16,313 --> 00:00:19,637 - The U.S. Navy was the first to market with radar. 3 00:00:19,637 --> 00:00:23,194 ^We had it in an advanced state of development, 4 00:00:23,194 --> 00:00:24,947 ^relative to the Japanese. 5 00:00:24,947 --> 00:00:26,947 ^We had begun to figure out how to use it 6 00:00:26,947 --> 00:00:30,090 and we made use of it at the Battle of Midway. 7 00:00:30,090 --> 00:00:33,257 (inspirational music) 8 00:00:33,904 --> 00:00:36,697 - And so, you have these radio physicists, in the 1920s, 9 00:00:36,697 --> 00:00:40,280 ^who are experimenting with new wave lengths 10 00:00:41,120 --> 00:00:42,760 ^in the electromagnetic spectrum. 11 00:00:42,760 --> 00:00:45,032 ^And, they're working really hard to help the Navy advance 12 00:00:45,032 --> 00:00:46,760 in to high frequency radio propagation's 13 00:00:46,760 --> 00:00:49,011 so that they can have sets that are effective, there. 14 00:00:49,011 --> 00:00:52,766 ^And, while they're thinking about potential applications, 15 00:00:52,766 --> 00:00:55,186 ^they have a couple interesting incidents 16 00:00:55,186 --> 00:00:59,353 ^when they're experimenting with these new hardware systems. 17 00:01:01,041 --> 00:01:04,478 - The radio division was focused on radio, 18 00:01:04,478 --> 00:01:06,196 and in doing radio experiments 19 00:01:06,196 --> 00:01:08,315 they noticed the affect of a ship 20 00:01:08,315 --> 00:01:10,732 passing in front of the radio 21 00:01:11,374 --> 00:01:13,146 and made the connection. 22 00:01:13,146 --> 00:01:15,374 The scientists, at the time, made the connection 23 00:01:15,374 --> 00:01:19,207 that this could be of use for detecting things 24 00:01:19,944 --> 00:01:23,027 when you could not visually see them. 25 00:01:23,410 --> 00:01:25,529 - And so, now, the challenge with radar 26 00:01:25,529 --> 00:01:29,063 is that they have this initial observation. 27 00:01:29,063 --> 00:01:33,147 This interesting field observation that was not intended. 28 00:01:33,147 --> 00:01:35,957 ^And then, the challenge for them for the next 10 years 29 00:01:35,957 --> 00:01:38,540 ^is trying to make that reliable 30 00:01:39,694 --> 00:01:43,615 ^and trying to make the readout of that information useful 31 00:01:43,615 --> 00:01:46,198 ^to people in the Navy on ships. 32 00:01:47,494 --> 00:01:48,941 ^- There was this continual push 33 00:01:48,941 --> 00:01:52,899 ^to operate higher frequencies and move to higher powers 34 00:01:52,899 --> 00:01:55,347 ^to detect targets at longer ranges. 35 00:01:55,347 --> 00:01:58,014 ^And, that culminated in the work 36 00:01:58,792 --> 00:02:02,731 that led to the first XAF, the first radar prototype. 37 00:02:02,731 --> 00:02:04,779 - The XAF was the first time they could take it, 38 00:02:04,779 --> 00:02:07,221 ^put it on a ship, demonstrate detection 39 00:02:07,221 --> 00:02:09,359 ^of aircraft at long ranges. 40 00:02:09,359 --> 00:02:12,167 ^And, show the Navy, Naval officers, 41 00:02:12,167 --> 00:02:14,084 ^what this new technique 42 00:02:15,602 --> 00:02:17,185 ^could provide them. 43 00:02:17,945 --> 00:02:21,456 ^- So, Page and the other NRL physicists and engineers 44 00:02:21,456 --> 00:02:25,206 take radar to sea for the first time, in 1938 45 00:02:25,353 --> 00:02:27,729 and this is the XAF radar system. 46 00:02:27,729 --> 00:02:29,091 And, this is their first opportunity 47 00:02:29,091 --> 00:02:33,258 to see how radar operates in an actual Navy environment. 48 00:02:33,613 --> 00:02:35,483 They're taking it out of the labs 49 00:02:35,483 --> 00:02:36,895 and they're putting it on a ship. 50 00:02:36,895 --> 00:02:38,625 So, there's this question of whether or not 51 00:02:38,625 --> 00:02:40,133 the Navy's going to have 52 00:02:40,133 --> 00:02:41,650 ^space for this, in a lot of regards. 53 00:02:41,650 --> 00:02:44,055 ^And, whether or not they will accept this new tool, 54 00:02:44,055 --> 00:02:46,197 ^and they view it as a viable new tool 55 00:02:46,197 --> 00:02:48,396 ^in the form that it's in right now. 56 00:02:48,396 --> 00:02:52,332 ^And so, what's really exciting is you have these officers 57 00:02:52,332 --> 00:02:53,759 ^who were part of the fleet exercises 58 00:02:53,759 --> 00:02:57,335 ^and they write their own endorsements of this new system 59 00:02:57,335 --> 00:03:00,589 ^and they send it to the head of the Atlantic Fleet, 60 00:03:00,589 --> 00:03:04,508 ^Admiral Johnson, and Admiral Johnson adds his endorsement 61 00:03:04,508 --> 00:03:08,675 ^to the viability of this stop-gap, prototype radar 62 00:03:09,061 --> 00:03:10,681 that's already being fielded. 63 00:03:10,681 --> 00:03:12,376 And, he says, "The XAF equipment 64 00:03:12,376 --> 00:03:14,974 ^"is one of the most important military developments 65 00:03:14,974 --> 00:03:17,439 ^"since the advent of radio, itself.". 66 00:03:17,439 --> 00:03:20,396 ^He says, "The development of the equipment is such 67 00:03:20,396 --> 00:03:23,580 "as to make it, now, a permanent installation 68 00:03:23,580 --> 00:03:24,731 in cruisers and carriers." 69 00:03:24,731 --> 00:03:25,920 And so, he's advocating 70 00:03:25,920 --> 00:03:28,795 that even in the condition that it's in, 71 00:03:28,795 --> 00:03:29,725 even though they're still working 72 00:03:29,725 --> 00:03:31,750 to improve and refine the system, 73 00:03:31,750 --> 00:03:34,000 he realizes the utility of even having 74 00:03:34,000 --> 00:03:36,101 this early generation radar set 75 00:03:36,101 --> 00:03:38,768 ^on as many cruisers and carriers 76 00:03:38,781 --> 00:03:41,198 ^as they can produce them for. 77 00:03:42,559 --> 00:03:44,168 ^And, that is the decision point 78 00:03:44,168 --> 00:03:47,724 ^at which XAF goes into limited batch production, 79 00:03:47,724 --> 00:03:50,641 and it's the CXAM that sees service 80 00:03:50,659 --> 00:03:52,467 in World War II and at Midway. 81 00:03:52,467 --> 00:03:55,967 Midway demonstrates that the radar systems 82 00:03:56,225 --> 00:04:00,392 can effectively provide early warning to the ships. 83 00:04:02,444 --> 00:04:06,605 - It helped in destroying a lot of the enemy aircraft. 84 00:04:06,605 --> 00:04:07,936 Otherwise, we wouldn't have known 85 00:04:07,936 --> 00:04:10,161 and we would have been under surprise. 86 00:04:10,161 --> 00:04:12,385 We wouldn't have seen them until much closer ranges. 87 00:04:12,385 --> 00:04:13,951 Wouldn't have had our aircraft in the right spot. 88 00:04:13,951 --> 00:04:17,175 So, it was clear that it was really instrumental 89 00:04:17,175 --> 00:04:20,208 in helping the fleet do as well as it did 90 00:04:20,208 --> 00:04:22,208 at the Battle of Midway. 91 00:04:22,841 --> 00:04:25,416 - Radar, certainly, was a factor. 92 00:04:25,416 --> 00:04:28,894 ^In that, it allowed us to know when the Japanese aircraft 93 00:04:28,894 --> 00:04:32,118 ^were approaching our ships, our aircraft carriers. 94 00:04:32,118 --> 00:04:33,581 ^And, allowed those aircraft carriers, 95 00:04:33,581 --> 00:04:37,132 ^the Yorktown in particular, to become prepared. 96 00:04:37,132 --> 00:04:39,212 ^The Japanese had no such warning. 97 00:04:39,212 --> 00:04:40,490 ^They did not have the radar. 98 00:04:40,490 --> 00:04:42,571 ^They had to rely on visual detection 99 00:04:42,571 --> 00:04:44,331 ^and they did not get a warning. 100 00:04:44,331 --> 00:04:48,113 ^They engaged our attacking aircraft over the ships, 101 00:04:48,113 --> 00:04:50,283 ^or as they approached the ships. 102 00:04:50,283 --> 00:04:53,149 ^And, we enjoyed the advantage, through the radar, 103 00:04:53,149 --> 00:04:57,316 ^of knowing when their attacking aircraft were coming. 104 00:04:58,031 --> 00:05:00,977 - The Navy officers working with this new equipment 105 00:05:00,977 --> 00:05:03,696 recognized its potential, at Midway. 106 00:05:03,696 --> 00:05:07,720 And, they recognized that it did have a tactical impact. 107 00:05:07,720 --> 00:05:10,536 And, it did improve their situational awareness 108 00:05:10,536 --> 00:05:13,145 and improved their ability to make sense 109 00:05:13,145 --> 00:05:17,145 of the nature and distribution of their threats. 110 00:05:19,204 --> 00:05:23,329 - A lot of the problems in lessons and uses of radar, 111 00:05:23,329 --> 00:05:27,496 the way radar was used in World War II and at Midway, 112 00:05:27,589 --> 00:05:29,009 are still applicable today. 113 00:05:29,009 --> 00:05:32,178 Rapid prototyping is still being used today. 114 00:05:32,178 --> 00:05:36,049 We've done that similar things with the SPS-49, 115 00:05:36,049 --> 00:05:38,132 the AN/SPQ-9B. 116 00:05:38,741 --> 00:05:42,908 Where we developed prototypes, demonstrated key capabilities 117 00:05:43,367 --> 00:05:47,284 and transitioned those capabilities to industry 118 00:05:47,534 --> 00:05:49,062 to produce them in quantity, 119 00:05:49,062 --> 00:05:52,447 to make them something that the Navy could take and use 120 00:05:52,447 --> 00:05:54,864 and have operated by sailors. 121 00:05:55,271 --> 00:05:56,627 - Building prototype systems, 122 00:05:56,627 --> 00:05:57,538 working with the fleet, 123 00:05:57,538 --> 00:06:00,187 working with the acquisition community 124 00:06:00,187 --> 00:06:01,604 and, in that way, 125 00:06:02,126 --> 00:06:03,459 moving our ideas 126 00:06:05,095 --> 00:06:09,175 in across that boundary into actual operational use. 127 00:06:09,175 --> 00:06:11,001 And, they were doin' exact same thing 128 00:06:11,001 --> 00:06:12,885 that we continue to do today. 129 00:06:12,885 --> 00:06:16,218 It's a great model for how NRL continues 130 00:06:17,092 --> 00:06:18,500 to advance technologies 131 00:06:18,500 --> 00:06:21,480 and move them into the fleet rapidly. 132 00:06:21,480 --> 00:06:23,980 (regal music)