WEBVTT

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^("The Marines Hymn")

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- The U.S. Navy was the first to market with radar.

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^We had it in an advanced state of development,

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^relative to the Japanese.

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^We had begun to figure out how to use it

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and we made use of it at the Battle of Midway.

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(inspirational music)

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- And so, you have these radio physicists, in the 1920s,

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^who are experimenting with new wave lengths

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^in the electromagnetic spectrum.

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^And, they're working really hard to help the Navy advance

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in to high frequency radio propagation's

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so that they can have sets that are effective, there.

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^And, while they're thinking about potential applications,

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^they have a couple interesting incidents

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^when they're experimenting with these new hardware systems.

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- The radio division was focused on radio,

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and in doing radio experiments

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they noticed the affect of a ship

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passing in front of the radio

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and made the connection.

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The scientists, at the time, made the connection

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that this could be of use for detecting things

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when you could not visually see them.

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- And so, now, the challenge with radar

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is that they have this initial observation.

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This interesting field observation that was not intended.

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^And then, the challenge for them for the next 10 years

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^is trying to make that reliable

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^and trying to make the readout of that information useful

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^to people in the Navy on ships.

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^- There was this continual push

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^to operate higher frequencies and move to higher powers

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^to detect targets at longer ranges.

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^And, that culminated in the work

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that led to the first XAF, the first radar prototype.

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- The XAF was the first time they could take it,

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^put it on a ship, demonstrate detection

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^of aircraft at long ranges.

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^And, show the Navy, Naval officers,

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^what this new technique

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^could provide them.

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^- So, Page and the other NRL physicists and engineers

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take radar to sea for the first time, in 1938

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and this is the XAF radar system.

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And, this is their first opportunity

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to see how radar operates in an actual Navy environment.

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They're taking it out of the labs

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and they're putting it on a ship.

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So, there's this question of whether or not

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the Navy's going to have

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^space for this, in a lot of regards.

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^And, whether or not they will accept this new tool,

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^and they view it as a viable new tool

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^in the form that it's in right now.

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^And so, what's really exciting is you have these officers

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^who were part of the fleet exercises

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^and they write their own endorsements of this new system

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^and they send it to the head of the Atlantic Fleet,

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^Admiral Johnson, and Admiral Johnson adds his endorsement

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^to the viability of this stop-gap, prototype radar

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that's already being fielded.

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And, he says, "The XAF equipment

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^"is one of the most important military developments

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^"since the advent of radio, itself.".

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^He says, "The development of the equipment is such

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"as to make it, now, a permanent installation

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in cruisers and carriers."

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And so, he's advocating

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that even in the condition that it's in,

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even though they're still working

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to improve and refine the system,

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he realizes the utility of even having

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this early generation radar set

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^on as many cruisers and carriers

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^as they can produce them for.

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^And, that is the decision point

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^at which XAF goes into limited batch production,

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and it's the CXAM that sees service

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in World War II and at Midway.

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Midway demonstrates that the radar systems

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can effectively provide early warning to the ships.

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- It helped in destroying a lot of the enemy aircraft.

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Otherwise, we wouldn't have known

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and we would have been under surprise.

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We wouldn't have seen them until much closer ranges.

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Wouldn't have had our aircraft in the right spot.

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So, it was clear that it was really instrumental

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in helping the fleet do as well as it did

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at the Battle of Midway.

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- Radar, certainly, was a factor.

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^In that, it allowed us to know when the Japanese aircraft

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^were approaching our ships, our aircraft carriers.

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^And, allowed those aircraft carriers,

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^the Yorktown in particular, to become prepared.

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^The Japanese had no such warning.

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^They did not have the radar.

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^They had to rely on visual detection

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^and they did not get a warning.

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^They engaged our attacking aircraft over the ships,

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^or as they approached the ships.

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^And, we enjoyed the advantage, through the radar,

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^of knowing when their attacking aircraft were coming.

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- The Navy officers working with this new equipment

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recognized its potential, at Midway.

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And, they recognized that it did have a tactical impact.

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And, it did improve their situational awareness

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and improved their ability to make sense

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of the nature and distribution of their threats.

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- A lot of the problems in lessons and uses of radar,

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the way radar was used in World War II and at Midway,

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are still applicable today.

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Rapid prototyping is still being used today.

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We've done that similar things with the SPS-49,

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the AN/SPQ-9B.

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Where we developed prototypes, demonstrated key capabilities

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and transitioned those capabilities to industry

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to produce them in quantity,

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to make them something that the Navy could take and use

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and have operated by sailors.

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- Building prototype systems,

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working with the fleet,

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working with the acquisition community

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and, in that way,

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moving our ideas

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in across that boundary into actual operational use.

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And, they were doin' exact same thing

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that we continue to do today.

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It's a great model for how NRL continues

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to advance technologies

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and move them into the fleet rapidly.

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(regal music)