|Title||Dolev-Yao is no better than Machiavelli|
|Publication Type||Conference Proceedings|
|Year of Publication||2000|
|Authors||Syverson, P., C. Meadows, and I. Cervesato|
|Conference Name||First Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security - WITS'00|
|Conference Location||Geneva, Switzerland|
We show that all attacks that can be mounted by a traditional Dolev-Yao intruder against common cryptographic protocols can be enacted by an apparently weaker `Machiavellian' adversary in which compromised principals will not share long-term secrets and will not send arbitrary messages. We also show that a Dolev-Yao adversary composed of multiple compromised principals is equivalent to an adversary consisting of a single dishonest principal who is only willing to produce messages in valid protocol form.
|NRL Publication Release Number|| |