|Title||Security Analysis of Accountable Anonymous Group Communication in Dissent|
|Year of Publication||2013|
|Authors||Syta, E., A. Johnson, H. Corrigan-Gibbs, S-C. Weng, D. Wolinsky, and B. Ford|
|Series Title||Yale University Technical Report|
Users often wish to communicate anonymously on the Internet using, for instance, group discussion forums or instant messaging. Misbehaving users may abuse this anonymity to disrupt communication, however, and existing solutions do not adequately address this risk. Messaging protocols such as DC-nets leave groups vulnerable to denial-of-service and Sybil attacks, mixnets are difﬁcult to protect against trafﬁc analysis, and accountable voting protocols are unsuited to general anonymous messaging. DISSENT, originally introduced by Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford (2010), is the ﬁrst general communication protocol that offers provable anonymity, integrity and accountability for moderatesize groups, and efﬁciently handles unbalanced loads where few members wish to transmit in a given round. We provide a full description of an improved DISSENT protocol, deﬁne its precise security properties, and give rigorous proofs of these properties. Our improved protocol is a direct result of this security analysis, which identiﬁed several non-trivial attacks on the original protocol stemming from subtle design ﬂaws.
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